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In this thesis I provide statistical evidence documenting rigging of foot-
ball matches in German long-term championship Bundesliga. For the pur-
pose I use 8326 matches played in top three German long-term competitions
through years 1995 – 2012. The championship is based on a point collection
in a standings table divided by strict success margins, e.g. title or relega-
tion. The margins lead to a non-linear incentive structure in which one point
is worth more for teams close to the margin. Uncertainty about the final
outcome, however, postpones the equilibrating effect to the last rounds of a
season. I find evidence of increased point earnings as a reaction on relega-
tion margin closeness at the end of a season. Increased effort of the marginal
teams cannot explain the findings as players exert no better performance in
the incentive situation. In the same time, their opponents with long margin
distance decrease their performance. In addition to that I provide evidence
on cheating cooperation proxied by variance of players’ performance. The
variance does not react on the incentive situation suggesting that teammates
behave unitedly. Performance of referees seems to exert stable performance
with no reaction on teams’ incentives. Overall, the results show strong evi-
dence of systemic point trading in German Bundesliga.
Keywords: Cheating optimization, football, match rigging, incentive.
JEL-Classification: D22, D61, K42, L83, M52.
Abstrakt
V diplomovej práci dokumentujem manipulovanie futbalových stretnut́ı
v Bundeslige, nemeckej dlhodobej sút’aži. Použ́ıvam 8326 zápasov z troch
najvyšš́ıch nemeckých sút’až́ı za roky 1995 – 2012. Ligová sút’až je založená
na zbierańı bodov do tabul’ky, ktorá je následne rozdelená ostrými hranicami
úspechu – napŕıklad titul, alebo boj o udržanie sa v lige. Ostré hranice vedú
k nelineárnej štruktúre, v ktorej má bod väčšiu hodnotu pre t́ımy bĺızko k
najbližšej hranici. Neistota ohl’adom konečného výsledku však posunie vy-
rovnávaćı efekt do posledných kôl sezóny. Na základe dát ukazujem zvýšenie
počtu źıskaných bodov pri t́ımoch, ktoré sú na konci sezóny bĺızko hranice zo-
stupu. Tento výsledok nie je však podporený ich zlepšeným výkonom. Naviac,
v rovnakej situácii podávajú ich oponenti s vysokou vzdialenost’ou k najbližšej
hranici zhoršené výkony. Výsledky podporujem analýzou kooperácie hráčov,
k čomu využ́ıvam rozptyl ich výkonov. Výsledky nepreukazujú žiadnu reak-
ciu, čo naznačuje, že hráči konajú v rámci t́ımu jednotne. Analýza rozhod-
cov nepreukázala žiadnu reakciu na zvýšené podnety t́ımov a rozhodcovia
preukazujú stabilné výkony. Predložené výsledky poskytujú silný základ pre
tvrdenie o systematickom obchodovańı s bodmi v nemeckej futbalovej lige.
Kl’́učové slová: Optimalizácia podvádzania, futbal, manipulovanie zápasov,
podnet.
Klasifikácia JEL: D22, D61, K42, L83, M52
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They all have plenty of points and we have nothing.
Jesus, we are not going to be relegated, are we?
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The amount of work building on Gary Becker’s economic perspective (Becker,
1993) has been increasing since the first read. Looking at people’s behavior
as a comparison of benefits and costs allows us to bring economics to basically
every area of man’s life. Likewise, cheating and corruption have fascinated
economists for a long time and the field of forensic economics has become a
raising phenomenon (Zitzewitz, 2012b). The fascination comes from a wide
acceptation of cheating and corruption as a welfare decreasing behavior with
a negative impact on economic efficiency. For example, works of Becker and
Stigler (1974) and Aidt (2003) are trying to set rules such that they avoid
cheating.
Covering tracks is the property that connects every cheating behavior and
makes its studying difficult from definition. Publicly available sport statistics
are an exception in an environment where lack of data became a standard.
Taking every sportsman or a sport team as a profit maximizer who weights
costs and benefits allows me to uncover various incentive settings. As a
result, every setting has different optimal cheating level.
In many countries have fans witnessed huge sport corruption scandals.
The biggest scandal witnessed Italian fans in 2006. Several top clubs, includ-
ing Juventus Turin, AC Milan or Lazio Roma, were found guilty of match
manipulation (BBC, 2006). Italians are, however, not alone and scandals
erupted also in Czech Republic (ČTK, 2010), Slovakia (SITA, 2013), Portu-
gal (Vernet-Riera, 2010) or Germany (Bild, 2005).
In this thesis I study cheating behavior of teams in Bundesliga, Ger-
man long-term football championship. Instead of concentrating on individual
cases I follow the works that explore general patterns resulting from incentive
reaction, e.g. Duggan and Levitt (2002); Wolfers (2006) or Zitzewitz (2006).
The cheating-revealing mechanism used in this thesis is mostly inspirited by
Duggan and Levitt (2002). Unlike the cited study I cannot use discontinuous
jump in incentives and I use gradual shift during a season instead.
After a season starts, teams form a standings table summarizing earned
points, scored goals and several other statistics. The table can be then di-
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vided into 3 parts – winners at the top, the ones in the middle and survivors
at the bottom of the table. Teams at the extremes are close to the ”success
margins”, i.e. title for winners and survival for the ones at the bottom. Teams
in the middle are, in contrast, far from both margins and both marginal rev-
enues of earning a point and marginal cost of losing one are low. At the end
of a season, teams get rid of most of the season’s uncertainty and many of
them already know for sure if they will reach one of the margins. It does not
matter if team survives in a league only by a better score or with a point
bonus. It can be therefore profitable for teams to earn as many points as
possible and then sell the surplus at the end of a season to the teams who
need it more.
Teams from the extremes demand cheating, while suppliers are the ones
from the table’s middle. Top teams should on average beat both teams in
the middle and the ones at the bottom. On the other hand, teams from the
bottom should on average lose. Therefore, top teams will not propose cheat-
ing, which will be demanded only by teams from the bottom part. Changed
frequency of winning can, however, be also caused by a higher motivation
of teams at the bottom, together with a lower motivation of teams in the
middle. To distinguish the cheating and change in motivation I analyze also
players’ and referees’ performance. Better results of a bottom-team caused by
a change in motivation must be accompanied by their higher performance.
In contrast, better results without a support of increased performance are
suspicious especially when the opponent decreases its performance in reac-
tion on incentive. Similarly, decreased performance of referees in suspicious
matches is a signal of their possible involvement in cheating.
The results show that last rounds of a season are accompanied by a sig-
nificant increase in earned points of teams at the bottom of the standings
table. In a simplified form can the explanation lie either in an increased ef-
fort of players or in teams’ cooperation (rigging). In this thesis I offer several
tests to push the explanation either to a higher effort or to a match rigging.
I collect data on players’ and referees’ performance thanks to which I am
able to monitor their performance. All the data I take from the website of
respected German sport magazine Kicker. The magazine collects not only re-
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sults, but also match statistics accompanied by editor’s subjective evaluation
of referee’s and players’ performance.
In an ideal world is referees’ performance stable. The opposite points
to their involvement in cheating. On the other hand, players’ performance
should be higher when their team earns more points. If the situation does
not occur, the point earnings must come from a different source – cheating.
Referees appear to perform rather stable no matter of the incentives in which
teams play. In contrast, players react greatly on changing incentives. In
general, players – in line with the assumptions – play better at the end of
season. However, players of teams fighting for a league survival perform
equally or worse while earning more points. In the same time, opponent
of the ”incentivized” team plays worse. The fact strongly suggests deceitful
behavior and cooperation of players on the final result.
This thesis contributes to a current knowledge in several aspects. Firstly,
it sheds more light into the optimization of cheating behavior, possibly gen-
eralizable also to business outside the sport industry. Secondly, the results
can improve valuation models of betting agencies allowing them to better
estimate chances of match outcomes. Thirdly, the results are utilizable also
by fans who can better estimate attractiveness of the match and, as a result
equalize the incentives during a season. Income from tickets plays a crucial
role in club’s budget. Clubs are therefore afraid of a lower visit rate, which
increases costs of cheating. Having this in mind, the result can be a smaller
shift in incentives and therefore less cheating. In the same time, the research
is done in one of the least corrupted environments in the world (T.I., 2012),
making the results to set rather lower bound of cheating.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In the second part I develop
theoretical background divided to literature overview and a formal model.
Section 3 describes the collected data together with summary statistics. Sec-
tion 4 develops empirical models in an attempt to reveal incentive reaction
of point earnings, referee and player performance. Section 5 shows the re-
sults of the empirical model and offers their interpretation. Finally, section 6





Although cheating and corruption is widely-discussed phenomenon, missing
data are rather limiting for empirical research. Lack of data comes from the
very nature of corruption where everybody engaged in the behavior tries to
hide it. Many studies are therefore based on a statistical analysis of general
patterns hidden in data. Standing on the idea, whole new research field of
forensic economics has emerged.
As Zitzewitz (2012b) claims, forensic economics involves many areas for
research such as finance, labor, public and educational economics. Heron and
Lie (2007) use a change in option backdating regulation to find if diminished
ability to alter the strike price results in lower abnormal negative stock per-
formance before executive option grants and abnormal positive return after
the execution. Using the data on option grants to CEOs, authors show that
abnormal returns are more typical for the period of weaker regulation. As
authors report, the magnitude of abnormal return before the grant is approx-
imately 6 times larger for the weaker-regulation period than for the stronger
one.
Another study comes from Chicago public elementary schools where Ja-
cob and Levitt (2003) study cheating of teachers. Authors detect unexpected
test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers in a classroom. As
a result they are able to detect teacher’s cheating in a minimum of 4-5% of
classes.
Great amount of data is offered also by sport statistics. In recent time are
the statistics increasingly used in forensic economic analysis. Wolfers (2006)
examines the gambling-related corruption called ”point shaving”. The mech-
anism is based on a spread given on widely expected win. In other words, the
bet is winning only if team wins by more than stated number of points (or
goals). As author claims, the idea lies in asymmetric incentives for players
who care about winning a game and gamblers who care about the spread.
Author finds indicative evidence that about 6% of strong favorites are will-
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ing to sell the game by manipulating the spread. Similar conclusions were
found by Gibbs (2007) who uses the same methodology, but instead of ap-
plying it on university-level basketball, he uses a professional NBA data.
The results are, however, challenged by studies of Paul and Weinbach (2011)
and Heston and Bernhardt (2008). First study found alternative results to
Wolfers (2006). Running several tests ranging from point spread to coach
analysis, they find only a little evidence to support Wolfer’s results. Heston
and Bernhardt (2008) explore the source of patterns explained by point shav-
ing. Authors report strategic movements as a better explanation as they, for
example, find similar patterns also on games without betting.
Another methodology uses Zitzewitz (2006) who studies nationalism in
judges evaluation in ski jumping and figure skating. While ski jumping judges
compensate for nationalistic biases of other members, figure skating engage
in vote trading and bloc judging. In ski jumping, the internationally-picked
referees compensate for nationalism, which is consistent with the desire of
fairness. In contrast, positive compensating biases of nationally-picked ref-
erees in figure skating seems to be consistent more with vote trading or reci-
procity. Another author’s study shows, using the same methodology, that
anti-referee-bias reforms adopted after 1998 and 2002 Olympics have not de-
creased the bias. On the contrary, the after-reform bias has slightly increased
(Zitzewitz, 2012a).
Corruption in football is estimated by (Reade and Akie, 2013) who use the
difference between predictions of bookmakers and those constructed by mod-
els. Authors argue that both estimates use the same data and thus should
predict same results. Any divergence of the two points to a corruption, which
is mildly discovered in the study. Other papers studying the biases in football
are more centered around social pressure as the cause. Rocha et al. (2013)
evaluates the home bias of referees. Brazilian referees systematically set more
time if home team is closely behind. Similarly, other papers positively test
for home bias when applying the card punishment (Pettersson-Lidbom and
Priks, 2010; Reilly and Witt, 2013), or penalty (Dohmen, 2008).
Probably the most famous example comes from Duggan and Levitt (2002)
who analyzed corruption in professional sumo wrestling. The mechanism
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is based on a simple idea that wrestlers get non-linear number of points
for winning, important for wrestler’s rank. Playing a tournament, each
wrestler’s payoff rises linearly after winning matches 1-7 and 9-10. How-
ever, 8th match is special in earning almost four times as many points as
for the other matches. Because the quality of players remains unchanged,
the probability of winning the 8th should be in theory the same as for the
rest ones. In contrast to the theoretical distribution, wrestler fighting on the
8th match wins more often than predicted. In other words, wrestlers win
more often when they can get more points for the same win. To distinguish
between higher exerted effort of the 8th-match wrestlers and actual cheating
authors push the answer to the latter one as e.g. 8th-match winners loose
too often in the next match.
Last methodology is the most important for this thesis due to its simi-
larity in two areas. Firstly, it exploits similar algorithm as the one used in
Duggan and Levitt (2002). Unlike cited algorithm, I cannot use strict jump
in incentives. Instead I use gradual increase of incentives to cheat for a par-
ticular group of teams. Secondly, both studies are done in low-level cheating
environments. Japan and Germany are considered as one of the least cor-
rupted countries in the world (T.I., 2012).1 As suggests Fisman and Miguel
(2006), country-level cultural norms translate also to real-world situations. I
expect similar mechanism to hold also for football environment.
Unlike sumo wrestling or any other individual sport, football is a collective
sport making it even more difficult to cheat. If a wrestler decides to cheat,
only one individual is needed to achieve the goal. On the other hand, one
individual in collective sports has lower ability to influence the outcome.
Therefore, higher difficulty to cheat makes football less prone to cheating
than, e.g. sumo wrestling.
1According to Corruption Perception Index 2012 is Germany on 13th place with 79
points (out of 100) and Japan occupies 17th position with 74 points respectively.
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2.2 Theoretical model
In this section I examine the incentives of both teams to rig a match. Building
on Duggan and Levitt (2002) I derive a model, which deals with an idea of
changed weighted revenues during a season, leaving the probability of future
cooperation constant. Unlike sumo wrestling in their study, football does not
offer discontinuous jump in incentives. For the reason I build my model on
gradual whole-season change in incentives.
The model makes following assumptions:
1. I consider team as one risk-neutral utility maximizer.
2. Both opponents and dates when they are challenged are known at the
beginning of season.
3. In a not-rigged match, both teams expect their chances to win the
match based on the quality of their and opponent’s team.
4. Teams have at least twice-differentiable utility function U(x) for which
d
dx
(U(x)) > 0 and d
2
dx2
(U(x)) < 0, where x denotes the distance from
the closer margin.
5. Revenues of cheating are dependent on the stage of season.
6. When two teams agree to rig a match, a transfer is made from proposing
team i to receiving team j.
7. The magnitude of the transfer is determined by teams’ bargaining.
Team i proposes a one-time, take-it-or-leave-it offer to the team j in
exchange for intentionally losing the game.
8. Teams play for a closer margin, i.e. for the margin that has the lowest
difference between team’s actual earned points and the points needed
to reach the margin.
Firstly, I assume that decisions are taken by one ”chief” and not by a vote.
I take the assumption in order to not deal with voting procedures inside the
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team. Moreover, there is no significant reason to think that average ”chief”
will be different from average voting outcome.
The necessity to know all opponents and the date of match in advance
is important for team to make predictions about their probability to achieve
desired goal. Similarly, team must know all the estimates of opponents’
quality to form expectations about future outcomes. Every team uses Poisson













where Πt is the probability of reaching a margin in a given time (round), k
is the number of matches needed to win in order to reach the desired margin
and π is a vector of probabilities of winning a match at time t. Fk is the
number of subsets of size k out of n, i.e. the number of possible combinations
to reach a margin. First bracket represents the sequence of probabilities of
the success of team i in round t. Second bracket represents the sequence
of probabilities of failure of team i in all but the t th round.3 Team in each
round t evaluates its probability Πt to reach a margin. After each round
then team compares potential revenues from cheating with its costs. Team
will try to rig a match if (and only if) revenues from cheating are higher or
equal to its costs.
The decision making about costs can be decomposed to its absolute
amount and the probability of being caught. The absolute amount is com-
posed of direct costs like monetary penalty and points deduction together
with implicit costs like loss of reputation and loss of revenues from market-
ing and selling tickets. Team weights above-mentioned costs by estimated
2For the sake of simplicity I assume that the match’s outcome is binomial – either win
or loss. Adding a draw would lead to a multinomial model, while little value would be
added to the model.
3I choose Poisson binomial distribution for the possibility to use different probabilities in
each round. The character of the championship when team faces in each round opponent
with different quality limits the use of simpler binomial distribution. Poisson bivariate
distribution is, however, only a generalization of binomial distribution; letting pt to be







probability of being caught. Until some exogenous shock occurs there is no
reason to believe that either these costs or the probability change throughout
a season.
Except potential costs when the cheating is discovered, team considers
also sure costs of bribing either opponent or referee (or both).4 The amount
for which are receivers (opponent or referee) willing to cheat is subject to a
bargaining process and can be thus dependent on the stage of a season. If the
receiver knows that proposing team strongly needs to earn points to reach
a goal, it will set price high and vice versa. Because all relevant informa-
tion is publicly available, the price charged will positively follow the number
of already played rounds. On the other hand, most of the teams stay in a
league for many seasons and thus compete with each other regularly. There
is thus probability with which they will change their roles, i.e. receiving team
becomes proposer and proposing team becomes receiver. Having the proba-
bility of meeting each other high, receiving team ”invests” in the proposing
team and charges less than it otherwise would causing the stability of the
”bribe”. As is stated in the assumptions, for the sake of simplicity I further
consider one-time take-it-or-leave-it offer by team i. Moreover, later I show
that theoretically I cannot distinguish between two approaches, because the
investment pushes the price to be less variable.
Despite the fact that team can earn 3 point for a win and 1 point for a
draw in any stage of a season, in the season’s latter stages has team more
information about its situation in the table. At the beginning of a season,
considering the quality of all teams, every team estimates its chances to win
a title. Except known factors like quality of players, support from fans and
financial stability is season’s outcome influenced also by uncertain factors
like team’s crisis or injuries.
Let’s divide the season into two periods, first and second. If the team is
4Real-world evidence shows several examples of match-rigging. In November 2013
British newspapers informed about the arrest of betting syndicate members, including
”at least three footballers” (Newell, 2013). Juventus Turin has been relegated to Seria
B, Italian second league, after the discovery of its match-rigging. Other three top teams
of Seria A, A.C. Milan, Fiorentina and Lazio Roma, were deducted points (BBC, 2006).
Overall, match-rigging is rather widespread involving spectrum of people from players to
referees (Gibson, 2013).
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at the bottom of the table in the first period, it has a pretty good chance
that it will do better in the second period and thus not descend to a lower
league. The same holds for the opposite case when team performs well in
the first period, but plays poorly in the second. Bribing in the first period
is thus an ineffective way of cheating, because the probability that team is
close to a margin is closer either 0 or 1 in the second period.
Hypothesis: Margin teams from the table’s bottom beat the non-margin ones
more often than predicted at the end of a season.
Imagine team competing for a title which is 3 points behind the season’s
goal, i.e. is 3 points behind the margin. Similar situation holds for the
opposite side of the table when teams compete for survival in a league. All
margins are strict, there is no sharing of revenues or costs. On the other
hand, teams far from the closest margin care less if they finish one rank up
or down.5
The existence of a strict margin implies that for teams close to one is
every point worth more than for teams in the middle of the standings table.
The relationship is stronger with approaching end of a season. Therefore,
contrary to strictness of the margin, the price of one point rises with the
closeness of the margin and stage of the season.
margin disti = min{|pointstitlei − pointsactuali |, |pointsactuali − pointsdowni |}
(2)
There are, however, many reasons why an opponent may be unwilling
to rig a match. Except moral reasons can opponent compete for a title or
he is trying to avoid relegation margin. In this case will the team compete
for points in a particular match. If both teams are competing for one of
the margins, they will try to get as many points as possible given their
possibilities. Mathematically can be the relationship stated as follows, such
5Complication arises with European international cups when not only the league winner
qualifies, but also several other teams. European cups thus create another margins to be
considered. For a simplicity I will not consider them in theoretical model and analyze
them further in an empirical one.
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As the name already suggests, resultij explains expected result of the
match, having values with mean equal to 1. Expected result higher than 1
suggests win of team i, less than 1 suggests win of team j and equal to 1
predicts a draw. First ratio explains the qualitative difference between the
teams, using number of points earned during period t − θ as a proxy.6 The
ratio takes expected value 1. The more points team i historically earned
comparing to team j, the higher is i ’s comparative quality and the higher is
the ratio. Second ratio explains relative motivation of teams represented by
the distance to closer margin. Similarly to the first ratio is expected value
equal to 1. To express similarity I use 1/margin distance. The ratio has
now similar behavior as the first one. Random influences on a particular
match are expressed by ε. Under random influence one can imagine weather
conditions, sudden injury of a key player etc. Despite being potentially very
significant in one match, I assume ε to be normally distributed and therefore
its expected value to be zero with rising number of rounds.
The probability of winning a match is always less than 1, because of the
non-zero quality of the opponent team and random influences. Therefore, if
team is close to the margin and every point can decide the binary outcome
of reaching a margin or not, the team can ensure the winning by cheating
cooperation.
The payoff of a proposing team i in a rigged match is:
[(Πriggedt − Πt−1)×Wmargin]i − Pij − Iij − c/2 (4)
where (Πriggedt and Πt−1) are the probabilities of reaching the margin in
time t and t-1 respectively. (Πriggedt −Πt−1) is therefore an added probability
of a rigged match comparing to round before. Wmargini represents the wealth
coming from reaching the margin after a season. Pij is the price paid by
6t is the time considered and θ is any number less than t.
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team i to team j for losing the match. Iij is the investment of team j to
team i with an expectation that it will pay the favor back in future if needed.
Because of the long-term character of the championship and high persistence
of teams in it, it is highly probable that teams will meet each other again. c
are the shared costs of cheating.
In contrast, team i ’s payoff from a fair match is:
[(Πfairt − Πt−1)×Wmargin]i (5)
Equation 5 is different from equation 4 in subtracted costs from cheating
and changed probability of reaching a margin. Πriggedt differs from Π
fair
t
by probability πij of winning the match. πij belongs to interval (0,1) and




To propose a cheating to team j must team i ’s payoff from cheating be
higher or equal than payoff from a fair match, i.e.
[(Πriggedt −Πt−1)×Wmargin]i−Pij−Iij−c/2 ≥ [(Π
fair
t −Πt−1)×Wmargin]i (7)





i ≥ Pij + Iij + c/2 (8)
As is implied in equations above, team j ’s payoff in a rigged match is
[(Πriggedt − Πt−1)×Wmargin]j + Pij + Iij − c/2 (9)
where contrary to team i ’s case, [Πriggedt −Πt−1]j ≤ 0. On the other hand,
its payoff in a fair match is
[(Πfairt − Πt−1)×Wmargin]j (10)
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For team j to rig a match the following equation must hold:
[(Πriggedt −Πt−1)×Wmargin]j+Pij+Iij−c/2 ≥ [(Π
fair
t −Πt−1)×Wmargin]j (11)





j ≥ −Pij − Iij + c/2 (12)
Similarly as in team i ’s case, [Πriggedt ]j differs from [Π
fair
t ]j only in proba-
bility of winning a match (1−πij). The higher is the probability (1−πij), the
higher is the outcome [Πfairt ]j and therefore the less profitable is the cheating.
Because (1− πij) belongs to interval (0,1), contrary to i ’s case it must hold
that [Πriggedt ≤ Π
fair




t ]j is negative.
By assumption, team i offers a one-time take-it-or-leave-it offer to team
j and has thus all the offering power.7 Team i therefore offers exactly the
amount to make team j indifferent between taking a bribe and trying to win
the game with probability (1− πij). Rearranging equation 12 I get:




j − Iij + c/2 (13)
The result is straightforward. Because [Πriggedt − Π
fair
t ]j is negative, the
greater is the decrease in probability of reaching the margin for team j the
more is team i forced to offer. Second and third parameters hold as well; the
higher is team j ’s welfare from reaching the margin, the more it has to be
7Omitting the assumption of one-time take-it-or-leave-it offer with bargaining power
in proposal team’s hands requires few complications. Instead of deriving Pij just from
receiver’s equation, it is necessary to equalize both teams’ equations such that they receive











t ]j − Iij
The equation shows that the price of certainty in winning the match is positively influenced
also by i ’s increase in payoff. Therefore, the more can i get from rigged match (i.e. the
lower is πij), the more it should pay to team j. The result is, however, negatively influenced
also by Iji, which has the opposite effect. The more team j decides to invest in ”cheating
relationship” with i, the lower is the price paid for intentionally losing a match. Because
of the investment, the price is rather stable during the season. Both approaches therefore
allow for bribing matches. I use the other due to its higher simplicity.
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compensated for decrease in probability of reaching it. Investment of team
j to ”cheating relationship” with team i influences negatively the proposed
price. Lastly, it depends on the transaction costs, which positively influence
the price of rigging the match.
Substituting equation 13 into team i ’s rigging condition (equation 8) I












j − c ≥ 0 (14)
Team i is therefore more willing to propose a cheating the higher is its
gain, the lower is j ’s loss and the lower are transaction costs. Team i ’s gain
can be decomposed to rigged probability and the fair one. Rigged probability
[Πriggedt ]i is independent from teams’ quality, while [Π
fair
t ]i depends on the
probability πij of winning the match against team j. Therefore, the higher
is the probability πij, the lower is the incentive for team i to propose a
cheating. Similarly, also team j ’s probability [Πriggedt ]j is constant, while
[Πfairt ]j depends on probability (1− πij) that j beats team i in a fair match.
Therefore, the higher is the probability (1 − πij) the less likely is team j to
accept an offer for a given price P (or i has to pay more). Interestingly, the
investment of j into the ”cheating relationship” with i does not influence i ’s
decision whether to propose a cheating or play a fair match.
Considering equation 14, cheating is demanded by teams which are closest
to the margin and supplied by teams with the furthest distance from the
nearest margin. The conclusion is based on a decreasing marginal utility
assumption. Team’s utility is composed from welfare of reaching a margin
and welfare from sold (or bought) matches. The best option for every team is
therefore to earn as many points as possible and then sell matches in the final
stages of a season to just reach the margin. By decreasing marginal utility,
the lowest marginal utility of one additional point (or lowest marginal cost of
losing a point) have teams with the longest distance from the closest margin.
On the contrary, the highest marginal utility have teams competing close to
a margin. Translating above-stated into real world championship, demand
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for cheating is created by teams at the top and bottom positions of the table,
while supply is created by teams in the middle. Strong team should, however,
on average beat both teams in the middle and at the bottom and it does not
need to cheat. Systematic cheating of a risk-neutral team can therefore be
seen only when competing for a survival. Strong team would propose cheating
only if it is risk-averse and is afraid of random factors arising at the match.
3 Data
I collect data from the website of German sport magazine Kicker. The mag-
azine specializes mainly on football news reporting and analysis. It performs
analysis for every match played in first, second and third German Bundesliga.
From the first Bundesliga I extract 5508 matches covering teams, result,
goals, number of spectators and editor’s evaluations of individual players
and referee from season 1995/1996 to 2012/2013. Similarly, I extract 4895
matches from seasons 1997/1998 – 2012/2013 from second Bundesliga and
1900 matches from the third covering seasons 2008/2009 – 2012/2013.
Using information about point earnings – 3 points for a win, 1 point for
a draw and 0 otherwise – I construct a standings table for every round. For
the purpose of this thesis I am interested in teams’ point standings before the
match, the variable therefore catches the standings in the previous round.
Building on the constructed table I use information about table’s division
to derive margins for which teams compete and respective points needed to
reach the closest one. To measure the distance I use absolute difference of
actual points earned before the match and points needed to reach the margin.
|Cumulated pointsi,t−1 − Closest margin pointsi,t| (15)
where the closest margin is the one minimizing the distance between
actual points and margins n and o. For example, if team needs 4 points to
win a title and is 10 points from relegation, the team competes for a title.
On the other hand, if team is 3 points behind the league survival and needs
15 points to win a title, the team competes for league survival.
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min |Cum. points−Marginn points|, |Cum. points−Margino points|
(16)
To concentrate the distance information of both teams into one number
I difference the margin distance of team j from the i ’s one:
|Cum. pointsi −Margin pointsi| − |Cum. pointsj −Margin pointsj| (17)
Moreover, because referee is always the same for both teams, for referee-
bias estimation I use symmetrical distance:
||Cum. pointsi−Margin pointsi|− |Cum. pointsj−Margin pointsj|| (18)
In order to describe the differences in quality of teams I difference the
points of team j from the points of team i. The variable stands on the ex-post
evaluation of teams’ performance. If team performs well, it regularly collects
many points, while the opposite is true for less successful team. Therefore,
the higher is relative quality of team i comparing to team j, the higher is
value of the variable.
Cum. pointsi − Cum. pointsj (19)
In each league teams compete for several margins. In the first Bun-
desliga compete teams for (1) title, (2) Champions league, (3) European
league (UEFA cup), (4) relegation and in seasons 1995/1996 – 2007/2008
also Intertoto cup. Title wins always (and only) the first team bringing con-
siderable honor and finance to the club. For both Champions league and
European league competitions are set quotas by Union of European Football
Association (UEFA) according to the prior results of teams from a particular
league. For example, in 2004 had German Bundesliga 3 places to Champions
league and another 2 to European league. In 2012 it was 4 places for Cham-
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pions league and 2 for European one. Importantly, the information about
the number of qualifiers is known in advance, before the season. Compli-
cations for modeling arise in deeper structure of qualification places, which
have different values. For example, 3 best teams were in 2012 sent directly to
the group stage of Champions league, while the fourth one was sent only to
qualification with probability less than 1 to get to the main stage. The fact
makes sharp margins fuzzier and underestimates the results. However, Ger-
man teams were nominated to the last, third round of qualification and were
placed to play against teams with a lower rank (from less football-successful
countries). The conditions are therefore set for German teams to succeed.
In case the team fails, third qualification round sends a looser to European
league which makes the fall less painful. Considering all the above-stated I
do not create another margin for individual types of Champions league and
European league qualifications.
Intertoto cup is subject to similar conditions as previous two competitions
except of the fact that the team has to sign-up for it before the season.
After the sign-up, the team is qualified if it fails to be placed in above two
European competitions and finishes at satisfactory position among signed-up
teams. Intertoto cup is, however, rather insignificant summer competition of
which the biggest benefit is possible qualification for European league. On
the other hand, comparably high quality of German teams makes them good
candidates for the tournament win. During years 2006 – 2008 were 33 teams
successful in qualifying for UEFA cup (11 per season). From these teams, 3
of them were from German Bundesliga, each in one year.
Relegation is the most important margin for the purpose of this study. In
all seasons of the first Bundesliga I count for 3 relegated teams per season.
However, the margin is similarly to European cups rather fuzzy. For example,
in season 2012/2013, 3 teams were subject to relegation, but only 2 directly
while the third worst team was sent to qualification play-off against the third-
best team in second Bundesliga.
The team will rather bribe an opponent in a league than in a relegation
play-off. Let’s suppose that team at the relegation-qualification place is con-
sidering ”buying a match”. The price of bribing is lower for team in the
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middle of the Bundesliga’s standings table, because it lost the opportunity
to fight for title or European cups and in the same time it is save from rele-
gation. On the other hand, team in the relegation-qualification is one round
from progression to higher-level competition. Therefore, its price for rigging
a match is high causing the cheating to raise more between the league teams.
Therefore, I do not place individual margin for relegation play-off.
For the second and third Bundesliga I count with only two possible mar-
gins – progression to a higher league or relegation. For both margins hold the
same rules described for the first Bundesliga. Despite the fact that margins
are not clear and for both exist also qualification, I do not consider this as
significant as teams prefer bribing the league team against the qualification
one.
3.1 Summary statistics
Teams in the first and second Bundesliga have to go through 34 rounds,
teams in the third Bundesliga go through 38 rounds. The season is divided
into two parts – autumn and spring. In the first part play all teams against
each other either at home stadium or away. In the second part is home-away
specification reversed to offer an equal advantage to utilize home spectators.
In first Bundesliga I use observations from season 2008/2009 to 2012/2013,
which sums together 1530 observations. In case of included Intertoto cup ob-
servations I count with 5508 matches covering seasons 1995/1996 to 2012/2013.8
Second Bundesliga covers seasons from 1997/1998 adding 4896 matches and
the third Bundesliga comes from season 2008/2009 with 1900 observations.
In each round teams compete for 3 points, otherwise they get 1 point
for a draw or 0 points for a loss. Building on the information I construct
a standings table for each round and calculate points needed to reach the
closest margin. In all rounds, teams fight for a title/advance margin 7084
times, for Champions league margin 457 times, 1002 for European league
margin and 8109 for relegation margin.
To cover referee’s performance I use marks assigned by editors of German
8If not stated otherwise, further I report only statistics of non-Intertoto matches.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Excluding seasons with Intertoto Cup
Points earned in a roundi 1.654 1.299 0 3 8326
Points earned in a roundj 1.076 1.237 0 3 8326
Points in a seasoni 22.999 15.73 0 85 8326
Points in a seasonj 23.266 15.674 0 88 8326
Cumulated pointsi−j -0.266 10.766 -52 55 8326
Distance from margini 3.018 3.06 0 21 8326
Distance from marginj 3.042 3.097 0 23 8326
Spectators 17112.06 16895.092 163 80720 7712
Sold-out 0.115 0.32 0 1 8326
Referee’s mark 3.133 1.054 1 6 8017
Players’ marki 3.412 0.545 1.773 5.818 8326
Players’ markj 3.584 0.524 2 5.773 8326
Players’ mark variancei 0.47 0.242 0.021 2.173 8326
Players’ mark variancej 0.456 0.236 0.037 2.596 8326
Including seasons with Intertoto Cup
Points earned in a roundi 1.665 1.299 0 3 12304
Points earned in a roundj 0.799 1.264 -4 5 12304
Points in a seasoni 22.801 15.632 0 85 12304
Points in a seasonj 23.073 15.593 0 88 12304
Cumulated pointsi−j -0.272 10.802 -52 55 12304
Distance from margini 2.722 2.904 0 21 12304
Distance from marginj 2.739 2.928 0 23 12304
Spectators 23126.024 18662.436 163 83000 11690
Sold-out 0.175 0.38 0 1 12304
Referee’s mark 3.168 1.073 1 6 11995
Players’ marki 3.439 0.55 1.773 5.818 12304
Players’ markj 3.618 0.534 2 5.773 12304
Players’ mark variancei 0.493 0.246 0 2.173 12304
Players’ mark variancej 0.485 0.245 0.037 2.596 12304
Notes: All summary statistics are computed from first, second and third German Bundesliga.
Data for first Bundesliga run from the season 1995/1996, for the second Bundesliga run from
season 1997/1998 and for the third one run from 2008/2009 ending all in 2012/2013. Except
of simple title and survival margin contains first Bundesliga also European championship,
including summer competition Intertoto Cup for which teams have to sign up before the
season’s start. Being unable to cover the sign-ups I compute statistics with and without
Intertoto observations. Presented summary statistics reflect only match-level observations.
For estimation I use also inverted observations with corrected standard errors.
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sport magazine Kicker. The marks range from 1 as the best mark to 6 as the
worst. After the referee’s evaluation has to every editor write couple of sen-
tences describing referee’s performance justifying the mark. Thanks to the
openness and high rank of the magazine I take the estimates as asymptoti-
cally unbiased estimates of referee’s performance.9 614 estimates are missing
because they were not shown on the magazine’s website.10 I am not able to
find any significant pattern the errors follow and I consider them as random.
Players’ performance is covered similarly to referees’ one. I use the eval-
uation of the Kicker’s editors who assign marks 1 to 6 to every of the 11
players starting the match. Again, mark 1 represents the best performance
and mark 6 the worst. In addition to simple mark analysis I create also
variance variable. The variable covers unity of a team.
I do not have any estimates for the substitutes. However, I do not consider
the fact as significant as opening eleven plays usually most of the match
and has the highest impact on the match’s outcome. On the other hand,
problems for which I am not able to control can arise if the substitutes serve
as a tool to manipulate match. For example, substitutes can be used for
point-shaving rigging technique (see e.g. Diemer (2009) or Wolfers (2006)).
It is based on the idea of winning the match by more than defined number
of goals, otherwise is the bet loosing. Because betting belongs to the biggest
sources of match rigging I consider the missing data for substitutes as a
shortcoming, which can underestimate results. To obtain number for whole
team performance I average the marks for eleven players. Similarly to the
referees, some data from web-page were missing . However, thanks to the
high number of players in one team I am able to get all 8326 observations.
Even though missing marks can move the average, they do not follow any
pattern and I consider the errors as random.
9Sutter and Kocher (2004) report that cross-checking of the editors with a referee
official reveals their assessment to be ”impartial and sticking very closely to the rules of
the game”.
10For example, whole season 1997 of the second Bundesliga lacks the estimates.
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4 Empirical Specification








Having stated in the theoretical model, I expect teams to earn the more
points the closer they are to the relevant margin. In the same time I expect
this effect to be negligible if teams are at the beginning of the season and
have still many opportunities to earn appropriate amount of points by playing
regular games. Figure 1 depicts the relationship graphically.
However, the effect can be caused either by a cheating or by a change
in teams’ motivation. To isolate the effects I run regressions on (1) referee’s
performance and (2) players’ performance conditional on different teams’
incentives.
To get estimates for whole season I regress equation 20. Due to the
unclear significance of Intertoto cup as a potential margin I estimate both
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samples – with and without Intertoto cup observations.
Pointsi,m = β0 + β1(di − dj) + β2Roundm + β3Relegationi
+β4(di−dj)×Roundm+β5(di−dj)×Relegationi+β6Relegationi×Roundm
+ β7(di − dj)×Roundm ×Relegationi + Θi,j,m + Λi + Φm + ε (20)
where (di− dj) denotes the difference in distances from margins of teams
i and j. Variable round denotes the round at which teams play the match.
Relegation is a dummy variable with value 1 if team i fights on relegation
margin and 0 if for other. Θi,j,m stands for all additional control variables
such as difference in teams’ quality, number of spectators or referee’s and
players’ performance. Λi are fixed effects of individual teams and Φm covers
match-specific fixed effects such as year, month and day in a week.11
I expect (di − dj) to negatively influence amount of earned points in one
round. Concept of distance stands on probability to reach margin. The
further is the margin the lower is the probability to reach it. Therefore,
team exerts more effort to get points if the distance is smaller. On the
other hand, team i is in easier position if team j has high distance. Team
i should therefore earn more points with decreasing difference in distances,
i.e. increasing incentive.
For all three coefficients explaining the effect I expect significant negative
sign, especially for the latter two. The negative effect of difference on incen-
tives should be even higher with increasing rounds and higher if team fights
for survival in a league.
Regression results with three interactions are, however, hard to interpret.
To reduce the estimates to only two dimensions I construct regressions on
sub-samples of (1) rounds 1 – 10 and (2) rounds 25 – 34. For sub-sample
estimation I omit seasons with Intertoto cup to come with clearer estimates.
Equation 21 describes the regression:
11Fixed effects of referees appear to be insignificant in any kind of specification. On
the other hand, the amount of present referees causes over-specification thanks to which I
omit referees fixed effects from further estimation.
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Pointsi,m = β0 + β1(di − dj) + β2Relegationi + β3(di − dj)×Relegationi
+ Θi,j,m + Φi + ε (21)
I expect first 10 rounds to have smaller effect than the last 10 ones as there
is lower amount of future opportunities to earn points and teams are more
certain about their final outcome. Similarly to the whole-season estimates I
expect the effect to be stronger for teams fighting on relegation margin than
for the others.
To better isolate the effect I create a sub-sample dataset based on rounds
and home-away stadium criterion. I expect any effect raised from distance
incentives to be higher when team plays at home stadium. Home matches
create better opportunity to rig a match as, for example, spectators are in
favor of the rigging (winning) team. As Pollard (1986) writes, most of the
wins are obtained by a home team. Author reports also reasons ranging from
crowd support to familiarity of environment. Similarly, Sutter and Kocher
(2004) report on Bundesliga’s data referee’s bias for home team if it is a goal
back.
In all specifications I control for several other variables such as number
of spectators, home environment or league. The more spectators visit the
match, the higher effort will both teams exert omitting the incentives raised
by margin distance. Exerting the best performance, quality of the teams
cancels out. I assume normal distribution of teams’ quality, which results in
relatively small differences for most of the teams resulting in high probability
of a draw. Because of the non-linearity of granted points for a win, this
would mean decreasing amount of points earned in one round with increasing
number of spectators. On the other hand, home environment forces domestic
teams to exert better performance, which leads to more earned points. For
better understanding of the effect I add also interaction of variables Home
and Spectators. I expect the variable to positively influence the amount of
earned points by home team as spectators push them forward. However,
they also create significant pressure on the players, which can cause them to
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fail in critical situations (Baumeister and Showers, 1986). Building on study
of Zajonc and Sales (1966) I consider the first effect as stronger. Authors
experimentally show that audience improves well-learned tasks and worsens
rarely-done ones. Regular season includes at least 34 matches in a league plus
several cup matches. Furthermore, the tasks are practiced on the training
sessions. Therefore, I consider match as a players’ regular task, which should
improve their performance with higher number of spectators.
Home team variable explains the effects of home environment other than
spectators. For example, Pollard (1986) shows that factors like environment
familiarity can be more important than a crowd support. I expect the home
environment to positively influence the amount of earned points in one round.
To control for importance of individual margins I add dummy variables
Champions league, European league and Relegation margin for both teams.
The effect of every variable is measured comparing it to the case when team
competes for a title or an advance to a higher league. I expect positive effects
for European competitions as they come up with great amount of financial
reward, especially the Champions league. I expect relegation margin to play
role especially in the latter stages of a season and average effect to be rather
insignificant.
Non-surprisingly, I assume the performance of team i to be on average
positively associated with i ’s point earnings. More complicated situation
arises with performance of team j ’s players. First possibility is that players
i react negatively on performance of team j. For example, amazing perfor-
mance of Bayern Munich causes even the best teams to play an inferior role.
Opponent’s reaction can be, however, also the opposite when good perfor-
mance of one team requires the other team to increase its effort and play
above average.
4.1 Is cheating the causality of shifted point earnings?
Better end-season results of survivor teams can be caused both by an in-
creased effort and by a cheating. In the following sections I design equations
which help me to shift the causality either to an increased effort or cheating.
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Referees should not shift their performance during a season. If their per-
formance reacts on changed incentives of teams I fail to reject the hypothesis
of their involvement in cheating.
In case of an increased effort I expect players of a treated team to support
the point bonus by a higher effort. Similarly, stable or increased performance
of opponent teams with long distance to a closer margin supports rather
increased effort explanation. On the other hand, I interpret the causality as
cheating if (1) survivor teams do not support their increased point earnings
by an increased effort and (2) if an opponent team from the middle of a
standings table reacts on the incentive with lower performance. In addition I
use variance of players’ performance as a proxy for their cooperation. Eleven
players are costly to cooperate. In case of cheating I expect the variance of
their performance to increase in incentive situation.
4.1.1 Different conditional performance of referees
Referees play an important role in every match, judging often cutting-edge
situations. Due to the weak role of modern technologies in a decision making,
referees have to build on their own capabilities and subjective judgment. If
referees are participating on a match-rigging, I expect their performance to
significantly decrease in matches with relatively high incentives of one or the
other team. I isolate the effect by running following equation:
Referee′s markm = β0 + β1|di − dj|+ β2Roundm + β3Relegationi
+ β4Relegationj + β5|di − dj| ×Roundm + β6|di − dj| ×Relegationi
+ β7|di − dj| ×Relegationj + Θi,j,m + Λi + Φm + ε (22)
where Referee′s markm denotes evaluation of referee’s performance at
match m. In contrast to previous regressions, referee is the same for both
teams in a match and therefore it does not matter which team plays on
margin. To take the fact into account I take absolute value instead of a
simple difference. Other variables are similar to those explained in equation
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20 including fixed effects of teams and date fixed effects.12
Even though I do not use more than two interactions in referee-bias es-
timation, I construct sub-sample also for referees. Using first and last 10
rounds I am able to better zoom into the effect by interacting the incentive
variable with appropriate margins for both teams. Following the theoreti-
cal model, best teams have no systematic incentive to rig the match as they
would beat the others anyway. Therefore, I am more interested in estimating
the effect for teams competing for survival in the league. The relationship is
covered by equation 23.
Referee′s markm = β0 + β1|di − dj|+ β2Roundm + β3Relegationi
+ β4Relegationj + β5|di − dj| ×Relegationi + β6|di − dj| ×Relegationj
+ Θi,j,m + Λi + Φm + ε (23)
I clear the incentive effects by adding several control variables. Number
of spectators can have various effects on referee’s performance. More specta-
tors (and therefore higher attention) serve as a check that referee will judge
situations correctly. In addition to that, I expect better referees to be as-
signed to more important matches. For example, to finale of the Champions
League are assigned only currently best performing referees. For the last 10
years were 4 referees judging Champions League finale also awarded as the
best referee in the world. Others were performing in the top ten (IFFHS,
2014). On the other hand, more spectators creates a pressure on referee
causing the performance to go down. The latter effect is, however, applica-
ble especially for less experienced referees assigned to less important matches
with less spectators.13 For sold-out matches I expect referee to have better
marks especially due to the selection. As I point out above, for matches with
12Similarly to point-bias estimates I do not include referees fixed effect due to their
insignificance and over-specification.
13I run a separate equation to test the argument. Added square of spectators variable
proves to be significant for whole-season estimates and for last 10 rounds of the season.
In both cases form the estimates concave relationship. The worst marks are estimated for
38,994 spectators and 42,642 respectively.
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high importance are selected the best referees who are awarded with better
marks.
I model referee’s performance also conditional on the margin for which
teams compete. Again by selection mechanism I expect referees judging
matches of teams playing on European competitions margin to have better
marks as teams can be significantly better off after the qualification. Referees
who judge teams on relegation margin should have with increasing teams’
incentives worse marks in the latter stages of the season if referees participate
in match rigging and stable otherwise.
4.1.2 Changing performance of marginal team players
Similarly to referees I estimate the effects of incentives on players’ perfor-
mance. If players are more motivated with increased incentives I expect
their marks to be better. On the other hand, if the team can collect more
points without increasing players’ performance, it raises a question about the
mechanism. Following equation estimates the effect:
Players′ marki,m = β0 + β1(di − dj) + β2Roundm + β3Relegationi
+β4(di−dj)×Roundm+β5(di−dj)×Relegationi+β6Relegationi×Roundm
+ β7(di − dj)×Roundm ×Relegationi + Θi,j,m + Λi + Φm + ε (24)
where Players′ marki,m denotes players’ performance of team i. Other
estimates follow the ones described in equation 20.
Building on the above-stated I perform sub-sample analysis also for player
incentive reaction.14 Moreover, except of simple sample division on rounds I
perform also sampling on home-away environment datasets.
Always two teams play in a match. Shift of the performance of one team
might not imply anything if the other team reacts in the same direction. In
that case, the effects simply cancel each other out. The performance shift of
an opponent team I explore in equation 26. Decreased performance of a team
14For the sub-sample estimations I omit season with Intertoto cup.
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with long distance to the closest margin if margin team needs it supports the
cheating story. On the other hand, increased or stable performance with
longer distance would cut the supply of points for teams demanding them.
Players′ marki,m = β0+β1(di−dj)+β2Relegationi+β3(di−dj)×Relegationi
+ Θi,j,m + Λi + Φm + ε (25)
Players′ markj,m = β0+β1(di−dj)+β2Relegationi+β3(di−dj)×Relegationi
+ Θi,j,m + Λi + Φm + ε (26)
I further support the analysis by exploring players’ mark variance. Out-
come of a football match is not based on a single player, but rather by a
cooperation of at least eleven of them. If a team wants to cheat, players have
to exert some costs of cooperation. It is probable that optimal amount of
players involved in cooperation is less than eleven. These players get lower
marks for their performance, while the remaining ones stay rather stable. In
other words, the variance of marks in a team increases if the team reacts on
a cheating incentive, while remains stable if it does not. Equations 27 and
28 cover the analysis of mark variance.
Players′ mark variancei,m = β0 +β1(di−dj)+β2Relegationi+β3(di−dj)
×Relegationi + Θi,j,m + Λi + Φm + ε (27)
Players′ mark variancej,m = β0 +β1(di−dj)+β2Relegationi+β3(di−dj)
×Relegationi + Θi,j,m + Λi + Φm + ε (28)
The effect of spectators on players’ performance can go both directions.
Matches with many spectators are greatly covered also by media, which even
strengthens the incentive for players to show-off. Moreover, matches with less
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spectators signal lower significance of the match, which can cause different
selection of players to starting eleven. On the other hand, more spectators
create pressure on players, which can cause their performance to decrease.
Team consists of eleven players who play many matches per season and are
used to the pressure. However, the team is composed such that it always
balances various types of players who react differently on pressure.15 In
addition, home environment creates conditions for even stronger influence
of spectators on players’ performance. Building on the previously-stated I
consider similar effects to be applicable on sold-out stadium influence on
players’ performance.
Home team players have better knowledge about the environment and
conditions on their own stadium. Moreover, they do not have to travel before
the match, which translates into their lower tiredness. Therefore, relaxing
the influence of spectators I expect the effect of home stadium to positively
influence players’ performance.
Referee-player quality relationship is potentially endogenous, but I con-
sider the causation going from referee to players as more significant. Players’
goal is to play against another team and consider (in ideal circumstances)
referee as invisible. On the other hand, referee’s goal is to directly interfere
in play and judge players’ behavior. Moreover, players can influence referee
only indirectly, while referee is ”dictator” on the pitch, leaving players only
very small space for bargaining. Clear judging leaves space for players to
play their game, which as a result increases their evaluated performance.
Therefore, I expect referee’s performance to positively imply higher players’
performance.
Similarly to previous two cases I expect players to exert higher effort when
playing for European competitions as they come up with high rewards for
participating teams. Relegated team will next season play with less attractive
opponents causing the demand for tickets to decrease, which cuts the club’s
income. Moreover, relegation cuts first Bundesliga’s teams from possibility to
15I support the story by exploring variance of players’ marks. I consider number of
spectators as a proxy of match importance. With higher importance increases also pressure
on players, which causes them to perform differently. Spectators prove to be one of the
few factors influencing variance of players’ performance.
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play for European cups,16 which subsequently cuts expected revenues even
more. On the other hand, teams competing for survival in a league have
only a small chance to compete for the European cups. In contrast, teams
winning a title or progressing to higher league earned significant amount of
money and respect. Therefore, I expect the relegation margin alone to be
insignificantly different from the title/advance one.
5 Empirical estimates and discussion
Table 2 present results of whole-season regressions. The table is divided into
two main parts. Left part describes results without Intertoto seasons and the
right one shows the results with them. I estimate both of them as Intertoto
cup plays unclear role in team’s decision-making. For each part of the table
I estimate equations 20, 22 and equation 24.
Columns (1) and (4) show the results for point-earning reaction on dif-
ferent incentives. Estimation of 3-way interaction involves except the base
variables also need to use 4 other interaction variables. Excluding variables
presented in the table I add also fixed effect of individual teams and date fixed
effect to the regressions. Fixed effects of referees prove to be insignificant for
any specification.
Results for incentive-reaction are not conclusive. Even though estimates
in both specifications have the predicted sign, crucial three-interaction co-
efficient does not prove to be significant. Predicted signs have also basic
distance coefficient and its interaction with round variable. Positive coef-
ficient of the basic difference in distances (di − dj) and negative one of its
round interaction suggest raising importance of the margin closeness with
approaching end of season. The fact is only slightly strengthened by another
two insignificant variables – distance interaction with the relegation margin
and three-way interaction term. The first one is positive for both versions,
16Team still can qualify to European league through winning German national cup DFB-
Pokal. The competition is, however, designed on play-off basis and stands usually on two
matches – one at home stadium and away the another. Random influences are therefore















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































while the opposite proves to be true for the latter one. Looking on the above-
stated, one can see the crucial role which plays round variable. Except of its
interactions are all distance interactions positive.
For example, the effect of distances’ difference on team competing for the
relegation margin at 10th round is positive.17 If team i is one point closer
to the margin than its rival (the term is negative), team i gets 0.00725 less
points. Modeling the same situation in 30th round, team i earns 0.0133 points
more. Holding the signs, the effect for non-relegation team shifts to 0.00906
points in the first case and 0.00462 in the latter one. Despite insignificance,
results suggest justness of the main hypothesis proved later in the sub-sample
analysis.
Digging deeper into the causality of the effect I run an estimation of
distance-incentive impact on referee’s mark. The results prove not only in-
significant, but also the signs are opposite to those suggesting referees’ in-
volvement in match-rigging. Difference in distances |di−dj| alone is the only
positive distance coefficient, i.e. the more different incentives teams have,
the worse performance referee shows. However, all other coefficients which
aim on suspicious situations suggest negative relationship – the higher teams’
incentives, the better is referee’s performance. The only fact suggesting sus-
picious behavior of referees are the fixed effects (not shown in the table).
Interestingly, I fail to prove referee’s fixed effects significant for any specifi-
cation including referee’s mark estimation. In contrast to the insignificance,
teams’ fixed effects are significant and resistant to change in specification. In
other words, referees’ performance is better distinguishable between teams
they judge than between referees themselves.
The most inconsistent results between the specifications with and with-
out Intertoto seasons are for player’s mark estimation. Non-Intertoto dis-
tance coefficients are mostly insignificant, while the opposite holds for the
others. However, signs prove to be consistent between the specifications.
Basic difference-in-distances coefficient (di− dj) is positive in both cases, al-
though significant only for Intertoto inclusion. Interactions of the distance
with round and relegation-margin variables are negative. Round interaction
17For the calculation I use non-Intertoto seasons.
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proves insignificant in both cases suggesting that margin closeness insignif-
icantly worsens players’ performance through season. The same holds for
relegation margin, however, this time significant in both specifications.
Several other interesting results arise from the estimates. The most sur-
prising one uncovers estimation of the spectators effect. In general, higher
number of spectators increases the probability of a draw.18 Possible ex-
planation lies in risk-aversion of teams. High number of spectators implies
increased costs of failure. When team wants to win, it has to use more play-
ers for offense instead of defense resulting in higher exposure to concede a
goal. With higher costs teams will rather play safer bet – a draw.
Individual margins does not prove to have significant impact on amount
of points earned in one round. On the other hand, players competing for
Champions league qualification exert more effort in match. In the same
time, I find the opposite result for European league. The result suggests
the importance of individual margins in order (1) Champions league, (2)
Title/advance, (3) European league and on the last place is relegation margin.
Moreover, marks are formed in couples for team i and j. Possible explanation
lies in publicity of the information. Standings table is publicly available
making it possible for everybody to form his own prediction. If team i knows
that team j competes for relegation margin and knows about its importance,
i knows that j will exert lower effort. Knowing the fact, lower performance
of team i is sufficient to get points.
5.1 Results for distance-incentive impact on earned
points
Considerable complexity of a three-way interaction estimation makes it hard
to isolate the effect. Table 3 present the point-bias results of sub-sample
analysis thanks to which I am able to eliminate one variable from interaction.
Tables are divided into three main parts showing estimates for both first 10
and last 10 rounds of season. Columns (1) and (2) show the results controlling
for team and date fixed effects, columns (3) and (4) show results without
18The fact arises from non-linearity of awarded points.
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them. Finally, last two columns show the results of incentive term applied
on each team separately.
Points earned in one round does not seem to react on the difference-in-
distances incentive term in the first ten rounds. The fact holds also for its
interaction with relegation margin variable. The coefficients are consistent
in all specifications represented by columns 1, 3 and 5. The result matches
to the prediction that teams at the beginning of a season have more options
other than match-rigging to reach margin. Similarly, at the end of a season
is basic difference-in-distances variable insignificant in both specifications.
However, its sign changes consistently for both specifications being positive
for first ten rounds and negative for last ten. In contrast to low t-statistics of
distance-interaction variable for the season’s beginning is its significance at
the end of season. Interestingly, the fact does not hold generally, only when
aiming on team competing on relegation margin. The result is consistent for
both specifications.
Individual team distance measure proves to be less significant determinant
of point earnings in a round. Coefficients at the end of a season have, how-
ever, predicted signs. Despite insignificance, the fact suggests point-earning
reaction on incentives. Other control variables exhibit similar pattern as for
whole-season effect estimation.
Figure 2 depicts the incentive-reaction graphically.19 The figure is divided
into three graphs showing results for (a) first stage of the season, (b) the
middle and (c) last ten rounds.20 For the first ten rounds (graph 2a) is
the effect flat around zero with strong reaction on tales. Graph 2b depicts
situation for rounds 11 – 24. Even thought is the line rather flat, it slightly
slopes around zero. Most visible effect is observable on the last graph, which
depicts the end of a season. Slope of the line is visibly steeper than for the
previous two graphs. In other words, teams react on distance incentives more
19For line estimation I use Epanechnikov kernel. To get rid of artificial symmetry caused
by double counting of one match for two teams I randomly select 50% of the sample and
use it for estimation.
20Third Bundesliga has 38 rounds in one season comparing it to 34 rounds in other two
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with approaching end of a season. The reaction is consistent with expectation
– teams relatively closer to the margin earn more points in a round while the
opposite is true for teams in distance.
In every graph is average pattern different from the one on tales. I con-
sider the fact as a result of margin creation. I create sharp borders between
the margins for which teams play and its subsequent distance to it. In reality
are the margins less strict, e.g. team closer to the Champions league margin
can still have an ambition to win a title (and qualify for Champions league).
5.1.1 Results for home-away environment
Table 4 shows the results of environment-specific estimates. None of the
distance estimates proves to be significant and distinguishable between the
home and away environment. Although the coefficients have predicted sign,
the division of data weakens the effect.
Intriguing situation arises when looking on the relegation margin variable
coefficients. Team competing for survival in a league earns at the end of sea-
son significantly more points when playing on home stadium. The effect holds
for both team i and the opponent. Relegation-margin team (again solely at
the season’s end) earns less points comparing to title/advance margin.
Running separate regressions for home and away environment I am able
to clearly isolate the effect of spectators. Number of people watching a match
has significantly positive impact on amount of earned points for home team.
Conversely, the effect is negative for away team. Interestingly, the effect of
sold-out stadium is negative for home team and positive for away one. In
addition to that is the effect applicable only to the beginning of season. Other
control variables follow the estimates from previous regressions and only a
few differences can be found between the home and away sample.
5.2 Referees (non)reaction on teams’ incentives
Insignificant results for distance-incentive variable as a determinant of ref-
eree’s performance suggest their non-involvement in match-rigging. Table 5
shows the results of the sub-sample referee analysis. I estimate the effects
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Table 4: Results for point-bias effect divided by home-away environment
Points at home Points away
Rnds. 1-10 Rnds. 25-34 Rnds. 1-10 Rnds. 25-34
Distancei − distancej 0.0227 -0.00467 0.00673 -0.00509
(1.41) (-0.99) (0.45) (-1.04)
(Disti − distj)×Reli -0.0129 -0.0103 0.0120 -0.00709
(-0.57) (-1.54) (0.56) (-1.08)
Round 0.000807 -0.0125** -0.00104 0.0150***
(0.12) (-2.27) (-0.17) (2.90)
Pointsi,t−1 − pointsj,t−1 0.0138** 0.00921*** 0.00845 0.00866***
(2.07) (4.41) (1.33) (4.19)
Spectators (tsd.) 0.00458** 0.00371** -0.00534*** -0.00365**
(2.56) (2.13) (-3.02) (-2.14)
Sold-out -0.159** -0.0241 0.195*** 0.0518
(-2.34) (-0.43) (2.94) (0.93)
Referee’s mark -0.0223 -0.0275 -0.0105 0.00951
(-1.26) (-1.59) (-0.63) (0.57)
Player′s marki -1.116*** -1.162*** -0.816*** -0.839***
(-26.18) (-29.39) (-17.91) (-18.84)
Player′s markj 0.924*** 0.944*** 1.121*** 1.159***
(19.66) (20.80) (28.03) (30.80)
Relegation margini 0.0464 0.140*** -0.0882* -0.123**
(0.86) (2.63) (-1.66) (-2.36)
Relegation marginj 0.0448 0.0976* -0.0295 -0.161***
(0.81) (1.80) (-0.56) (-3.10)
Champ. league margini -0.00362 -0.232* 0.113 0.0172
(-0.03) (-1.86) (1.06) (0.13)
Champ. league marginj -0.113 0.0475 -0.000342 0.182
(-1.02) (0.35) (-0.00) (1.51)
European league margini 0.0960 0.0714 0.0704 0.0325
(0.90) (0.74) (0.67) (0.35)
European league marginj -0.0449 -0.0565 -0.0805 -0.141
(-0.41) (-0.60) (-0.80) (-1.48)
Constant 2.002*** 2.398*** 0.474 0.0261
N 2116 2320 2116 2320
F 239.9 226.2 200.9 205.7
R2 0.590 0.596 0.589 0.589
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. Estimates (1) and (2) show the results for solely home teams
divided further between matches played in first and last 10 rounds in a season. Similarly, estimates
(3) and (4) cover away teams. Except shown estimates I control for the league.
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both with and without team and date fixed effects.
The only point at which behavior of referees seems suspicious are again
fixed effects of particular teams. In addition to that, team fixed effects prove
to be more significant for end-of-season estimates. The fact, however does not
imply match rigging. In the last rounds it is clearer for which margin team
competes and what is the probability of reaching it. With rising pressure at
the end of season it is even more necessary to judge situations correctly to
not raise unnecessary overreaction of players. Committee assigning referees
to particular matches identifies potentially dangerous matches and assigns
a better one to it. The argument is backed by the signs of distance vari-
ables. Even though they prove to be insignificant, the signs are consistent
for both specifications and for both team i and team j. In the season’s first
stage have teams competing for relegation negative impact on referee’s per-
formance with higher closeness. In contrast, at the end of season is the effect
positive. Similarly, referees’ performance is significantly higher if they com-
pete for Champions league margin. As I claim above, Champions league is
associated with great amount of financial resources ranging from UEFA do-
nations, higher amount of sponsor donations to increase in income from home
matches. Likewise, Champions league is associated also with great amount
of reputation as, for example, its matches broadcast all over the Europe and
world. High rent associated with successful competition qualification incen-
tivizes teams to widen their used ”toolbox”. As a result, better referees are
assigned for the suspicious matches.
To back previous-stated arguments up, figure 3 shows polynomial smooth-
ing of referee’s mark on difference of distances. First graph in the figure shows
estimates for rounds 1 – 10. Line does not show any reaction on change in
incentives and remains flat for whole domain. Graph 3b shows the estimates
from the middle of season. Equally to the previous case, the shape of the
line is flat lying slightly above mark 3. Insignificance of distance incentives
on referee’s performance is underlined by the last graph, which is again flat,
especially around zero distance difference. Graphs 3b and 3c reveal tales
slightly different from average behaviour. The fact can be caused by two rea-
sons; firstly, for extreme incentives exert referees extraordinary performance.
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Table 5: Referee-bias estimates for rounds 1-10 and rounds 25-34
Referee’s mark
1-10 25-34 1-10 25-34
(1) (2) (3) (4)
|Distancei − distancej| -0.0451 0.00289 -0.0502 0.00349
(-1.38) (0.22) (-1.55) (0.27)
|Disti − distj| ×Relegationi 0.0519* -0.0107 0.0429 -0.00857
(1.96) (-1.07) (1.63) (-0.87)
|Disti − distj| ×Relegationj 0.0441* -0.00794 0.0429 -0.00857
(1.66) (-0.80) (1.63) (-0.87)
Spectators (tsd.) 0.00395 0.00137 0.00318 0.000646
(1.55) (0.59) (1.31) (0.30)
Sold-out 0.00934 -0.231*** -0.0503 -0.233***
(0.10) (-2.94) (-0.58) (-2.98)
Round 0.0361* -0.0210 0.0159* -0.0190***
(1.81) (-1.41) (1.73) (-2.92)
2. Bundesliga 0.219* 0.0537 0.117 -0.234*
(1.70) (0.37) (1.09) (-1.89)
3. Bundesliga 0.219 -0.232 0.0740 -0.382***
(1.46) (-1.46) (0.61) (-2.79)
Relegation margini -0.0581 -0.0243 -0.0507 -0.0246
(-1.32) (-0.42) (-1.19) (-0.46)
Relegation marginj -0.0467 -0.0222 -0.0507 -0.0246
(-1.08) (-0.41) (-1.19) (-0.46)
Champions league margini 0.125 -0.276** 0.148 -0.229**
(1.16) (-2.19) (1.39) (-2.07)
Champions league marginj 0.118 -0.198* 0.148 -0.229**
(1.10) (-1.79) (1.39) (-2.07)
European league margini -0.0235 -0.123 -0.0116 -0.119
(-0.26) (-1.25) (-0.13) (-1.28)
European league marginj -0.0314 -0.0927 -0.0116 -0.119
(-0.35) (-0.99) (-0.13) (-1.28)
Constant 2.337*** 4.617*** 2.951*** 4.012***
(4.42) (9.67) (21.89) (16.99)
N 4232 4640 4232 4640
F . 2.320 . .
R2 0.0467 0.0610 0.00585 0.0187
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. Estimations (1) and (2) include also fixed effects of 85 teams, all
years, months and days in a week. For all regressions I use absolute value of difference in teams’
distances as a measure of referee’s exposure to marginal benefits of the teams.
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Second reason is rather technical; strict margin do not perfectly correspond
to reality. For example, Bayern Munich will always want to compete for a ti-
tle even though it is few points back. Due to the inconsistent tail movements
between graphs 3b and 3c I consider the latter one as stronger.
Altogether, the quality of referee’s performance seems to be quiet inde-
pendent on any determinants. Overall significance of the referee-bias models
float on very low levels comparing it to the other two. In conclusion of the
above-stated I do not expect referees to participate on match rigging.
5.3 Player-bias reaction on distance-incentive
Even though players react on average positively on distance incentive, zoom-
ing into the relegation margin reveals teams’ no higher performance at the
end of a season. Table 6 presents the results. In contrast to that are results of
the opponent teams j, which exert lower performance when team i is in the
incentive situation. Team players appear to act unitedly as the performance
variance does not react on the incentives. Whole model of performance vari-
ance has small significance implying that players are rather homogeneous.
Looking on the distance variables reveals that players’ reaction on the
distance to margin is rather insignificant for first ten rounds. Simple differ-
ence in distances of the teams is weakly positively significant for fixed effects
specification, while its significance decreases when the effects are removed.
The distance’s interaction with relegation margin appears to be negligible,
but consistently negative for all specifications. The situation is more intrigu-
ing when looking at the end of season. Basic difference-in-distances variable
reveals significantly positive effect on players’ performance. In other words,
the higher are incentives, the better is the performance of team i ’s players.
The effect is consistent between the specifications. However, the interaction
term is significantly negative for all specifications. Teams competing for sur-
vival in a league show no change in performance at the end of a season. The
effect is consistent through all the specifications.
Negative interaction coefficient is surprising as relegation is the ”low-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































title/advance margin is the highest. Knowing that in case of not reach-
ing the margin I still can qualify for European cups (in first Bundesliga) or
simply remain without exercising any margin. On the other hand, teams
competing on relegation margin are fighting for survival with no insurance
making marginal costs of lost point higher. In contrast to expected higher
performance of relegation teams is its estimated lower performance at the
end of a season. The fact is surprising especially in connection to point-bias
estimates. Table 6 shows that in the same time when players exert lower
performance they earn more points.
The results are weaker when looking on players’ performance separately
for home and away environment. The signs of coefficients in Table 7 are
consistent with the previous results. Even though are the coefficients in-
significant, t-statistics show raising importance of the incentive term at the
end of a season. Importantly, there is no difference of players’ performance
in reaction on incentive term between home and away environment.
Supply for the reported point demand can be created only by an opponent
team if it is sufficiently far from the closest margin. Similarly to the previous
analysis I explore shift of the opponent team performance in reaction to
changed incentives. In case of a present cheating I expect opponent team
to decrease its performance if it plays against team fighting for a survival
margin at the end of a season. Table 7 summarizes the estimates of equation
26. Opponent teams j with a longer distance to the closest margin do not
seem to react in every case. The only case in which players react negatively on
changed incentives is when players of a treated team i compete for a survival
in a league. Moreover, the effect is again present solely at the end of a season.
In other words, players of an opponent team decrease their performance in
the moment when treated team needs it on average. Summing it up in
connection with previous estimates, players of teams fighting for a survival
margin earn too many points while exerting no bigger effort at the end of a
season. In contrast to that, players of an opponent team exert in the same
time lower performance.
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Table 7: Different players’ performance for home-away environment
Players’ mark at home Players’ mark away
Rounds 1–10 Rounds 25–34 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 25–34
Distancei − distancej 0.0123 0.00548** 0.00418 0.00313
(1.48) (2.42) (0.54) (1.37)
(Disti − distj)×Reli -0.00601 -0.00478 -0.0111 -0.00363
(-0.51) (-1.41) (-0.99) (-1.13)
Player′s markj -0.651*** -0.618*** -0.609*** -0.527***
(-36.77) (-32.44) (-33.36) (-31.05)
Referee’s mark 0.0267*** 0.0117 0.00325 0.000633
(3.00) (1.35) (0.38) (0.08)
Round -0.00130 -0.00930*** -0.00125 -0.0107***
(-0.41) (-3.28) (-0.39) (-4.10)
Spectators (tsd.) 0.000135 -0.00233** 0.00159* -0.000666
(0.16) (-2.53) (1.79) (-0.78)
Sold-out -0.0941*** -0.0973*** -0.0605** -0.0135
(-3.20) (-3.36) (-1.98) (-0.47)
Pointsi,t−1 − pointsj,t−1 0.00248 -0.00102 -0.00718** -0.00307***
(0.72) (-0.98) (-2.19) (-3.07)
Relegation margini 0.170*** 0.121*** 0.133*** 0.162***
(6.36) (4.56) (4.93) (6.46)
Relegation marginj 0.0923*** 0.172*** 0.117*** 0.139***
(3.37) (6.36) (4.46) (5.64)
Champ. league margini -0.0330 -0.104* -0.113** -0.194***
(-0.56) (-1.82) (-2.10) (-3.33)
Champ. league marginj -0.175*** -0.163** -0.0462 0.0890
(-3.26) (-2.42) (-0.82) (1.44)
European league margini 0.0600 0.0311 -0.0562 0.00718
(1.28) (0.62) (-1.12) (0.15)
European league marginj -0.0475 -0.0546 0.0341 0.0668
(-0.96) (-1.13) (0.69) (1.41)
Constant 5.797*** 6.192*** 5.709*** 5.832***
(67.17) (47.54) (66.30) (49.62)
N 2116 2320 2116 2320
F 104.0 94.53 86.46 94.06
R2 0.434 0.396 0.438 0.414
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. Estimates (1) and (2) show the results for solely home teams divided
further between matches played in first and last 10 rounds in a season. Similarly, estimates (3) and (4)


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3.1 Unchanged player performance variance in response to in-
centives
Digging deeper into the cause of an increased point earning of the ”sur-
vivors” at the end of season I present also estimates of incentive effect on
the players performance variance. Table 9 summarizes results of equation
27 estimation. Almost all distance terms are insignificant. The interpreta-
tion can be twofold. Firstly, the insignificance leads to the conclusion that
team players create united block and do not deviate from the group behavior.
I assume non-zero transaction costs, which makes cooperation for cheating
harder. No reaction of variance on incentive creates a binary situation when
either cheats a whole team or no one. Cooperation of more than 11 players
requires substantial costs, which leads to the decrease of cheating. Cheating
as the causation of increased point earnings is therefore weakened. Second
theory leaves room both for cheating and increased effort causation. Football
is a collective game. Performance of one player is hugely dependent also on
the performance of his teammates. Therefore, by an externality, it is not
necessary to include all players into cheating to worsen the performance of
the whole team. In any case, present incentive changes performance of the
whole team, not only few individuals. Taking into account all the previous
pro-cheating estimates I consider externality explanation as more probable.
Moreover, anecdotal evidence from convicted players suggest rather individ-
ual involvement in corruption (see e.g. SITA (2013)).
Similarly to the treated team I provide variance analysis also for opponent
players. Both treated and opponent teams’ variance react insignificantly to
changed incentives.
Interesting result arises from positive spectators influence on the variance.
More spectators cause players to perform differently. Explanation can lie in
the higher pressure caused by more spectators.21 The result suggests that
players react diversely on match importance.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this thesis I provide statistical analysis of cheating behavior in German
long-term football championship Bundesliga. Strong margins and diminish-
ing season’s uncertainty provide an incentive structure thanks to which I
am able to reveal several patterns. The structure makes cheating-demanders
from the teams close to the survival margin and cheating-suppliers from the
teams far from all margins. I show that the incentive scheme works for point
earnings and players’ performance. The bottom teams earn disproportion-
ately more points at the end of a season while exerting no more effort. In
contrast, opponent teams who are far from margins exert less effort when
playing with ”survivors”. Additionally, I show that referees do not react on
teams’ changing incentives.
Sport has witnessed many scandals ranging from football (BBC, 2006),
Formula 1 (BBC, 2009) or even Olympic games (Hemphill, 2003). In every
case were alleged concrete people for being an exception in otherwise good
working system. This thesis shows footballers as rationally acting individuals
making decisions by weighting revenues and costs of cheating. In this case can
system setup make a big difference in level of cheating. The thesis uncovers
one of the possible mechanisms through which can cheating occur.
Room for future studies is in using sport statistics instead of a complex
subjective performance evaluation. For example, in its simplest form can one
use yellow and red cards as an approximation of referee’s bias. Moreover,
construction of the margins in this thesis rather underestimates the true
effect. Stricter differentiation between margins can bring more significant
results. Similarly, financial resources gainable after reaching a margin can
bring a new perspective to the problem.
The results are interesting especially due to their generalizability. The in-
centive scheme is applicable to basically every long-term championship based
on a point collection, not only on football. In this thesis I explore German
environment, which belongs to the least corrupted in the world. The explo-
ration in more corrupted countries can bring more significant results. Con-
sidering only football, there are more than 90 football leagues in the world.
60
Building on the presented thesis, future research can go even beyond that
and aim to every long-term championship with an existing lower margin.
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